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THE CLASSICAL BULLETIN Volume 53 
The Strategy that Gave Independence 
to the U.S. 
We celebrate this year our nation's "birthday," 
but 1976 is also the bicentennial of what General 
Washington, a master of understatement, as 
well as, as we shall see, a master of strategy, 
called an "unhappy predicament." The 
c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f ' s  s o l u t i o n  t o  the 
predicament was the strategy that won the 
war, and put the United States on the way 
towards being a real country. This solution 
was the thoroughgoing adoption of Fabian 
strategy. Looking into what this was, and how 
Washington made i t  work, permits a better 
appreciation of Washington's real stature in 
military history. 
The pragmatic genius who gave his name 
to the strategy was Q. Fabius Maximus, who 
was also given the name Cunctator, for slander 
and opprobrium when the issue was in doubt, 
for honor afterwards. It meant Delayer. In 
217 B. C. Hannibal had already made himself 
master of all Spain, had already crossed the 
Alps with his army and a cavalry that included 
trained war elephants, and had already 
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destroyed a Roman army a t  Lake Trasimenus. 
Rome's immediate reaction was to appoint 
Fabius Dictabor. On taking the field, he laid 
down a simple and immutable plan of action: 
He avoided all direct encounter with the enemy; 
moved his camp from highland to highland, 
where Hannibal's Numidian and Spanish 
c a v a l r y  cou ld  n o t  f o l l o w ;  a n d  w a t c h e d  
Hann iba l ' s  m o v e m e n t s  w i t h  u n r e l a x i n g  
vigilance, looking for opportunities. Most of 
these opportunities were simply chances to chip 
away a t  Hannibal's strength by cutting off 
stragglers or the details constantly being sent 
away from the main body to forage for supplies. 
His idea, in the smooth words of Plutarch, was 
"to let the force and vigour of Hannibal waste 
away and expire, like a flame, for want of the 
aliment." Against a superior force overseas from 
its home base, this made great good sense. And 
this constant avoidance of battle, which could 
more accurately be called watchful opportunism 
than retreat, led after a few months to the 
entrapment of Hannibal's main force in the 
vqley of the Vulturnus (now the Voltorno) 
River. Seeing that the water and good pasturage 
of the upper valley had drawn Hannibal into a 
jar, Fabius, using his superior knowledge of 
the territory, quickly descended to Hannibal's 
rear with 4,000 men to seal the opening, leaving 
other forces upon the heights on both sides. 
This could have been decisive, but Hannibal, 
boxed in as  much by his own blunder as  by 
Fabius's watchfulness, was capable of making 
up for error with stratagem. The cattle, which 
ancient armies generally kept around for the 
sake of keeping the meat fresh, could in 
darkness be made to pass for an armed force. 
He had torches and bundles of dry twigs and 
branches tied to their horns. After nightfall, 
these were lit, and Hannibal's soldiers drove 
them up one of the enclosing mountain ridges. 
The c a t t l e  advanced  calmly, t h e  anc i en t  
historians say, until the fires burned down to 
quick. The cattle then stampeded, and the 
Romans were stampeded from enough of the 
ridge to pass an army through. 
The thing that set Fabius apart from his 
fellow Romans and fellow generals was that 
he could learn from experience, even other 
people's experience, so much faster than anyone 
else. Fabius knew how to win a set battle: he 
had already been awarded a triumph for 
defeating the Ligurians that way, and driving 
them back to the Alps. But i t  only took one 
Trasimenus to teach Fabius that this was not 
the way to fight Hannibal: 15,000 Roman 
soldiers killed, and 15,000 more taken prisoner, 
were to Fabius a clear lesson. Lucius Minucius 
was slower to see, and so was the dissatisified 
Roman public: they gave Lucius, Fabius's 
second in command, equal authority, with the 
understanding that he would go out there and 
win the war. He went out there and fought a 
battle on the first opportunity, which was a 
trap : Hannibal, knowing Lucius' eagerness, 
had hidden part of his force in a plain which, 
though riven with gullies and ditches, seemed 
level from a distance. Then a t  dawn, in full 
sight of L. Minucius, he sent a detachment up 
to take the hill overlooking it. Minucius 
swallowed the bait. He attacked the detachment, 
first with cavalry and a few troops, then, as 
the engagement was constantly requiring more 
and more force, with his whole army. I t  was 
a complete encirclement, and would have meant 
the complete loss of yet another Roman army 
had not Fabius arrived in time to cut open an 
escape route. Lucius Minucius learned his 
lesson, and openly, abjectly, submitted himself 
and his army to the command of Fabius. 
The dictatorship having come to its half-year 
term, Fabius lay down his command, and new 
consuls were chosen who continued his policy 
of wearing out the enemy while avoiding 
disaster. Meanwhile, there arose a politician 
who was becoming popular by declaiming that 
as long as Rome fielded generals like Fabius, 
the war would continue: Rome must send out 
a general who would march out there and win 
it. This second Minucius was named Varro. 
He won election, and what he marched out 
to was that eternal landmark in the history 
of defeat: Cannae. It is now the name of a 
classic in tactics, for one still speaks of a 
"Cannae encirclement." Just as in a duel, 
where the challenged party may choose the 
weapons, Hannibal was able, once again faced 
with a Roman General eager for battle, to 
choose the situation under which the battle 
would be fought. Varro, confident in his new 
levy of 88,000 men, twice the number of the 
4 THE CLASSICAL BULLETIN Volume 53 
enemy, set up the red battle ensign the first 
dawn after closing, a t  Cannae. Hannibal 
marched his men around to have a position 
upwind of the Roman army, so all the dust 
in marching and later in fighting would be 
blown into the eyes of the Romans. Further, 
he weakened his center, placing his worst and 
weakest there, reserving his best troops for the 
wings. The Roman forces attacked, drove the 
enemy before them a t  the center, but made no 
progress a t  either right or left wing, so their 
final formation before the massacre was a 
perfect half moon, surrounded, compressed. It 
was reported that 50,000 were slain and 14,000 
taken prisoner. The Roman eagerness to finish 
the war, gambling almost everything on the 
event of a single day, actually extended the 
war: winning i t  took fourteen more years. 
Before Cannae, Hannibal's force led an 
outlaw existence with tenuous supply. This 
stunning victory opened to him the resources 
of all southern Italy; even Capua, second 
largest and richest city of all Italy, submitted 
to Hannibal's leadership. Cannae led also to 
an alliance with Philip V, king of Macedon, and 
to the election, in Syracuse, of Hannibal's 
agents as generals. The total cost, then, of the 
Roman one-day gamble near the little town of 
Cannae on the Adriatic, was southern Italy, 
Sicily, and Macedon. It should also have cost 
them the war. 
That it did not was partly because Hannibal 
unaccountably did not march on Rome, and 
partly because. Fabius calmed the Romans, 
averted panic, and, with what had been 
condemned as fear and cowardice now 
recognized as wisdom, again took the helm. 
With everyone now aware that repudiation of 
his policies had meant Cannae, he persevered 
in them. Rome never again opposed one single 
large army to Hannibal in Italy, but stifled his 
movements with two or more smaller ones. 
Though he came out the winner in numerous 
engagements, even trapping and destroying 
Marcellus, Fabius' usual colleague in the 
consulship and his fellow-commander, in 208, 
Hannibal gradually became more and more 
weakened. Fabius was always there, but yet 
Hannibal could never trap him. Yet he always 
had to be dealt with. Eventually, Hannibal's 
only object became to hold his ground in the 
south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear 
in the n:orth with fresh forces. But when 
Hasdrubal finally came in 207, the Roman 
consular army faced him and beat him. 
Hannibal was so stricken with the loss of 
his hopes that he abandoned all thought of 
offensive, and merely held on for four years, 
contracting his forces into the wild mountains 
of Bruttium, the region of the "toe" of the 
Italian "boot." What brought him out, of 
course, was that Scipio, the grown son of the 
first Roman General Hannibal ever entrapped, 
circled and destroyed, had marshalled the nerve 
to take the war to Carthage, and now (late 203) 
had to be faced in North Africa. 
In sum, Hannibal faced eight generals in 
Italy, over a space of fifteen years. A tactical, 
though perhaps not a strategic, genious, he 
entrapped and imposed disaster on all of them, 
but not Fabius. 
Did Gene ra l  Washington  know a l l  t h i s ?  
Unless I've overlooked it, there is not one word 
in the twenty-eight large volumes of his 
collected writings to show that he did. My own 
conclusion is that he arrived a t  the Fabian 
position by his own independent wisdom, and 
good judgement of the circumstances of 1776. 
He was told about Fabius in '78, long after 
he had already determined on the Fabian 
principle and was holding onto it with calm, 
despite all complaints of dilatory cowardice, 
despite the attempts to have him replaced with 
some such hot, eager Minucius as Horatio 
Gates, even despite the modern historians who, 
not knowing about Fabius either, fail to 
appreciate his retreats, caution, and slow, 
patient ways. 
The situation that had called for the original 
Fabian tactics, of course, was that one was 
faced with a superior enemy who, if you 
opposed him in the open in a frontal attack, 
could destroy your force in a day (even if he 
didn't know what to do after the victory), but 
whose weakness was the logistical fact that he 
was overseas from his ultimate source of supply. 
Quite beside the obvious parallels, the situation 
for the United States of America was rather 
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worse: Unlike the Rome of 218, the United 
States of 1776 could not afford to lose 64,000 
fighting men in a single day. Washington 
certainly knew that. 
The very surprising thing is that he seems 
for several years to be the only American 
who did. As one examines the years of the 
Revolution, this becomes very clear. But before 
one could hope to see the situation through 
Washington's eyes i t  is necessary to look a t  
what the "United States of America" actually 
was in '76, the more so since '76 is taken as 
the nation's birthday. 
1776 made us not a country, but a group 
which would, given the successful conclusion 
of seven more years of war, still only be 
thirteen separate but allied states. The alliance 
was defined by the Articles of Confederation, 
which actually were based on the military needs 
of 1754! In that year a gentlemen's agreement 
of alliance among the colonies seemed 
prospectively useful with a view to wars with 
the French and Indians. So Ben Franklin 
produced one. It was rejected, but later formed 
the basis of the Articles, which were started 
in 1776. These formed the basis for Congress's 
actions as if adopted, but were not even fully 
ratified until March of 1781. Though Article 
One said "The Style of this Confederacy shall 
be the United States of America," the next 
defined the Confederacy as a "firm league of 
friendship." In short, no Constitution, no 
country. Under the Articles, taxation there 
was none, but the power to make requisitions 
on the states; executive there was none, but 
the power in Congress to "appoint such 
committees and officers as may be necessary 
for managing the general affairs"; judicial 
branch there was none, but in the Congress 
was the "last resort in disputes and differences 
between the States." The States, in short, were 
countries, the United States a United Nations, 
each with not a governor, in the modern sense 
of that word, but a head of state. Ben Franklin 
was, for illustration, President of Philadelphia. 
It  was such a hopeless and non-working 
league that it couldn't even pay an army. 
Nobody appreciated this better than the 
Commander-in-Chief. Washington's full-time 
clothed as they ought to be. In short, my 
situation has been such that I have been 
obliged to use a r t  to conceal i t  from my officers." 
That was Washington's 1776. Though acutely 
aware that his available scope of action was 
limited, he was even then planning the attack 
on occupied Boston. The plan was ingeniously 
Fabian, and completely effective. Though the 
British had strongly fortified Boston, they had 
left Dorchester Heights vacant. The heights 
commanded the harbour as well as the city, 
a n d  W a s h i n g t o n  took  t h e m  a n d  b e g a n  
bombardment. The Admiral of the British fleet 
informed General Howe that he would not keep 
the King's ships in the harbour while 
Washington held the heights. A detachment 
was sent to dislodge the Continental forces, but 
was repulsed. That Washington was on the 
heights to stay meant that Howe had to leave 
Boston or lose the support of the fleet. He 
abandoned Boston March 17, taking 11,000 
soldiers with him back to Halifax. Washington, 
it is clear, had a very good talent for seeing 
and making use of available opportunities, and 
for grasping basic principles. 
The private letter setting out Washington's 
1776 shows it, expounding a large part of his 
constant and successful strategy as well as  
the difficulties of the situation: (1) to hide 
inability to act lest the exposure of it lead to 
attack and annihilation even if hiding weakness 
lead to ridicule for inaction, and (2) never 
permit anything to become the all-or-nothing 
gamble. He expounded a third basic part of 
his strategy tm years later in a letter to a 
chastened Lafayette, who had already learned 
the wisdom of it in the field. The incident 
leading to the letter is demonstrative proof that 
Washington's Fabian tactics were (1) not 
recognized as such in North America, and (2) 
that the need for them was not recognized in 
North America. I suggest that the reason the 
need was not recognized, and thus that the 
strategy itself was not recognized as Fabian, 
and defended as such, was Washington's not 
spe2king in his own defense. 
The demonstration is that early in 1778, 
the United States of America in Congress 
assembled voted to attack Canada. This had 
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already been attempted in '75. Lafayette, an  
eager volunteer and a Marquis, but also an  
impetuous youth of 21, was to be in charge. 
On his arrival in New York to take command, 
he found 960 12-year-olds and 60-year-olds and 
in betweens. No army, even he realized, with 
which to complete the march, much less to 
mount an offensive. He begged off, which 
Washington was perfectly happy to permit him, 
but also asked leave for a lesser coup, "a 
diversion against New York." Washington's 
reply (10 March, '78) is the key to the strategy 
which won the war. "The expedition which you 
hint a t  would be inadvisable in our present 
circumstances. Anything in the way of formal 
attack, which would necessarily be announced 
to the enemy by preparatory measures, would 
not be likely to succeed. If a stroke is 
premeditated in that quarter, i t  must be 
effected by troops stationed a t  the proper 
distance for availing themselves of the first 
opportunity afforded by the enemy. This 
therefore must rather be the effect of time 
and chance, than premeditation." Washington 
was a constant and successful practitioner of 
the advice he gave eager subordinates. Two of 
his best-known successes stemmed from 
surprise turnarounds from what had been 
thought to be retreat. Driven out of New York 
by 20,000 British soldiers, and retreating in 
the van of the British advance through New 
Jersey to Philadelphia, he suddenly turned upon 
Lt. C1. Rall's advanced corps of Hessians Dec. 
26. This, of course, is known as the "Crossing 
of the Delaware." He repeated this brilliant 
exploit Jan. 3, blinding Cornwallis with 
campfires, nightmarching to his rear, and 
surprising three British regiments and three 
companies of light cavalry a t  Princeton, and 
only then encamping for the winter. 
In the volumes of correspondence, one can 
see the Commander-in-Chief directing, in a 
clearly Fabian way, the 1777 campaign which 
led to the surrender of Burgoyne. As everyone 
gone near the battle of Freeman's Farm October 
7, a battle which was, in fact, won by the 
unauthorized leadership and unsurpassed 
bravery of Benedict Arnold, who had already 
been relieved of command by Gates! How does 
Washington fit in? Informed that Generals 
Lincoln and Schuyler had in mind to unite 
the militia to the continental force in frontal 
opposition to the advancing Burgoyne, the 
Commander-in-Chief advised : "If this is really 
the intention, I should think it a very ineligible 
plan. An Enemy can always act with more 
vigor and effort when they have nothing to 
apprehend for their flanks and rear, than 
when they have, and, it is one of the most 
approved and most universally practiced 
Manoeuvres of War, to keep their fears 
continually awake on these accounts, and, when 
circumstances permit, to be actually in condition 
to give them Serious Annoyance in those Parts. 
Independent of the Inconveniences that attend 
a situation, where the Rear and Flank are 
constantly exposed to the insults of light 
parties which may be a t  every moment 
harassing them; the necessity of never losing 
sight of the means of a secure retreat, which 
ought t o  be the first object of an Officer's care, 
must be exceedingly embarrassing where there 
is a Force in such a position as to endanger 
it. If a respectable body of men were to be 
stationed on the Grants, it would undoubtedly 
have the effects intimated above, would render 
it not a little diffifficult for Mr. Bourgoigne t o  
keep the necessary communication open, and 
they would frequently afford opportunities of 
intercepting his Convoys. If there were none 
there, he might advance with Security, leaving 
Small Posts behind, and might draw his 
Supplies regularly and without interruption, 
than which nothing could tend more to facilitate 
his operations and give them Success." He 
further added that any militia beyond that 
needed for the harassment of rear, flank, and 
supply might properly be added to the front. 
knows, "Gentleman ~ohnny"  - Burgoyne spent 
most of that summer marching through This letter of August 16 to the governor of 
wilderness from Ticonderoga towards Albany, New York over the use of his militia shows 
only to fall short of his goal and surrender plainly the Commander-in-Chief's clear Fabian 
to General Gates Oct. 14. Gates, of course, understanding. Much more important, though, 
received the credit, even though he had never is that it contains the instructions which 
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trapped Burgoyne and forced his surrender, as 
we will shortly see. A similar letter was sent 
on August 20 to General Gates, noting that 
Gates could expect Daniel Morgan's Riflemen 
on the 28th, and the regiments of Colonels 
Cortland and Livingston "within a few days; 
with these Reinforcements, besides the Militia 
under General Lincoln . . . I am in hopes you 
will find yourself equal to stop the progress 
of Mr. Burgoyne and by cutting of his supplies 
of Provision & ca. to render his Situation very 
Ineligible." 
Burgoyne's march shows neatly what the 
Fabian treatment can do to an army. He left 
Ticonderoga with 9,500 men, July 6. After a 
month or so, he was forced t o  send his left 
wingoff to Bennington for supplies. On 
August 16, the same date as  Washington's 
letter to Governor Clinton of New York 
opposing a use of militia in frontal opposition, 
John Stark's New Hampshire militiamen set 
upon and destroyed this wing. The governor 
and the local generals thus will have received 
Washington's advice and this immediately 
illustration of the wisdom of it simultaneously. 
Burgoyne, now with 6,000 men, met the 
enlarged American force, about 6,000 strong, 
under the command of Gates 30 miles north 
of Albany September 19. Burgoyne attacked, 
according to British sources ; Morgan's Riflemen 
struck first according to the American sources. 
All agree that the British force took heavy 
losses. Burgoyne fortified his positions a t  the 
site of the battle, the clearing of Freeman's 
Farm, and waited for reinforcements. Almost 
three weeks later, during which time the British 
force and morale were being diminished by 
constant American raids, he attempted a 
break-out. This was repulsed. Benedict Arnold 
then took over and led the counter-attack 
which captured one of Burgoyne's two 
fortifications, and gave the victory in this 
engagement, called the Battle of Saratoga, or 
perhaps more accurately, the second battle of 
Freeman's Farm, to the American side, 
October 7. But this was not yet the complete 
victory which "The Battle of Saratoga" is 
now thought of. It is the difference between 
winning an engagement and forcing your 
opponent's complete surrender : Burgoyne still 
had a potentially effective force of 2,000 men, 
with which he retreated from the field, to 
Saratoga. But his path to retreat was not clear; 
there was this militia in the way, in accordance 
with Washington's advice on its placement. 
He had nowhere to go, and on October 14 
asked Gates for terms of surrender. Given the 
Fabian background, one can see that directly 
behind Arnold, who deserves credit for forcing 
the retreat, comes Washington, who deserves 
credit for the strategy which made the retreat 
impossible. Gates, "the victor of Saratoga," was 
simply there as the officer-in-charge to 
surrender to. 
This, of course, is the victory that led to 
the French Alliance, which would in the end 
mean the entrapment of Cornwallis a t  Yorktown 
as soon as the French fleet arrived. But 
meanwhile, an army had to be kept together, 
and Washington had to avoid losing it all 
between '77 and Yorktown ('81). This required 
constant and alert practice of what became 
conscious Fabianism. As we have noted, the 
reinforcements sent to Gates were intended 
for rendering Burgoyne's "Situation very 
Inelligible." In the face of a superior force 
overseas from its home base, this was the 
appropriate response. The basic principle - 
which Gates never grasped-is simply to 
survive as an armed force until opportunity 
permits delivery of an annoying or decisive 
blow. Failure to survive obviously meant you 
permitted something to become critical and 
were defeated. Period. Survival meant ultimate 
victory. This was, I learn from military 
historian Ira Gruber the heart of French 
strategic thinking of the day. Its nature could 
not go unrecognized everywhere, nor for much 
longer. Washington often sought written advice 
from the Generals in camp. Here, in the 
translation of Colonel $ohn Laurens, is the 
response of a recent arrival which will also 
serve to identify for us a contemporary 
understanding of Roman military history : 
"What we ought to propose to ourselves, is to 
defend the country inch by inch, . . . to hinder 
the enemy from making himself master of it, 
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consequently never to receive him but when 
we are protected by a natural or artificial 
fortification, in other words, to carry on what 
is styled a defensive war. This is our true part 
and it is so obvious that in Europe, all Military 
men and even those who are not so, suppose 
this to be our Conduct - If the Americans 
could consult the modern daily publications, 
they should there find that the model offered 
to General Washington is principally Fabius, 
that wise Roman who ruined Hannibal by 
refusing to fight him in plain. Fabius however 
commanded Romans, but these Romans had 
been thrice defeated, they were disheartened, 
dreaded the enemy, and were nearly reduced 
to the condition of new and unformed troops. 
The Consul conducted himself accordingly, 
avoided general Battles, kept himself on the 
defensive, always occupying strong positions 
and where the enemy could not attack him but 
with considerable disadvantage - it is true that 
this kind of war was not approved of a t  Rome ; 
Men of leisure who loved to be amused by great 
events, men of impetuous dispositions, men 
whose discernment was not sufficient to judge 
of what circumstances required, in a word the 
particular enemies of the consul, turned him 
into ridicule, affixed to him insulting surnames, 
but the sage General was unmoved by them. 
He knew that after all, the event would 
determine his reputation in the world - he 
therefore invariably pursued his plan, and by 
his firmness which was crowned with success, 
he merited the appellation of Savior of Rome." 
I t  was never a case, though, of advising the 
General to model himself after Fabius. This 
was simply recognition that he was Fabius, 
and a use of Livy to encourage him to remain so. 
There is nothing in all the volumes of orders 
and correspondence to show that Washington 
had read Livy : This first instance of it occurs 
much after Washingt.on had already by his own 
insight duplicated the strategy of Livy's hero. 
I t  was a lesson that LaFayette learned 
thoroughly: entrusted with the command of 
the principle force opposing Cornwallis in 
Virginia, the Marquis borrowed $2,000 to dress 
his 1,000 soldiers (April of '81) and marched 
them from Baltimore to Richmond. 
Having 2,000 militia, his own corps of 
nearly a thousand light infantry, and 40 
dragoons with which to defend Virginia from 
Cornwallis' 4,500 British regulars, he did a 
volte-face from his first impulse to "risk 
something," realizing his own ruin would be 
the ruin of the State, His May 24 '81 letter 
to the Commander-in-Chief is illuminating : 
"Were I to fight a battle I should be cut to 
pieces, the militia dispersed, and the arms lost. 
Were I to decline fighting, the country would 
think itself given up. I am therefore determined 
to skirmish, but not to engage too far,  and 
particularly to take care against their immense 
and excellent body of horse, whom the militia 
fear as they would so many wild beasts." The 
Fabius-Hannibal parallel abides, even to the 
elephants. But that is an aside. LaFayette was 
now twenty-four, and Sir Henry Clinton, British 
Commander-in-Chief for North America, 
easily assumed that his man in the south, 
Cornwallis, would destroy the youth. Cornwallis 
himself thought to nail him. "The boy will not 
escape me," he said. But the boy would not 
be pinned down, even when Cornwallis took 
the capital, flushing Governor Jefferson. The 
boy on that occasisn managed to outmarch 
Cornwallis to interpose his force between 
Cornwallis and the state arsenal, and then to 
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dog Cornwallis about the state, changing his 
camp daily, sometimes even marching on 
Cornwallis' rear, sometime even attacking, 
never utterly committing himself. Finally 
abandoning thoughts of catching LaFayette 
and looking instead to the comfort and health 
of his men, Cornwallis settled in a t  Yorktown 
during the first week of August. And LaFayette, 
though he had left Virginians near panic by 
not "stopping" Cornwallis, had survived in 
force to be, upon the arrival of Admiral de 
Grasse and General Washington, part of the 
three-lever nutcracker which forced the 
surrender of Cornwallis a t  Yorktown. 
He had remained a t  all times 20-30 miles 
distant from his intending captor, doing the 
same thing he ordered his subordinates: 
"Whatever road the enemy take, you will please 
to proceed in that route, and, if opportunity 
o f f e r s ,  a t t a c k  them." H e  h a d  become 
strategically, in fact, Washington's altera 
persona, and, as  "A Gentleman in LaFayette's 
Army" wrote to the Baltimore paper of July, 
'81, "was Fabius to Cornwallis's Hannibal." 
L a F a y e t t e  knew consciously w h a t  h e  was  
doing. So had his commanding officer Greene, 
who had earlier honored Cornwallis by naming 
him a Hannibal, and had done rather well as 
a Fabius himself. The word was out. And, 
with de Grasse's decision to bring the French 
fleet to  Chesapeake Bay msking i t  possible to 
pen Cornwallis in Yorktown, rather than 
Clinton in New York, the war was won as 
soon as  Washington succeeded in sneaking south 
out of New York. He contrived to make the first 
ten days of the 400-mile march to Yorktown 
look exactly like an impending attack upon 
Staten Island from the New Jersey shore. 
Artfully and completely deceived, Clinton finally 
pursued too late to be of use: he was apprised 
of the surrender en route. 
How was i t  that the experienced Cornwallis 
could sit still long enough to become encircled, 
and "the boy," through the entire summer, 
could not be trapped? Part  of the answer is 
that Washington was the boy's Commander-in- 
Chief. Have a look a t  Washington's instructions 
to Lafayette on the occasion of LaFayette's 
first command after the non-invasion of Canada. 
After putting him in charge of the territory 
between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers, 
Washington advised : "You will remember that 
your detachment is a very valuable one, and 
t h a t  a n y  acc ident  happen ing  t o  i t  would 
be a very severe blow to this army. You will 
therefore use every possible precaution for its 
security and to guard against a surprise. No 
attempt should be made, nor anything risked, 
without the greatest prospect of success, and 
with every reasonable advantage on your side. 
"I shall not point out any precise position to 
you; but shall leave it to your discretion to 
take such posts occasionally as shall appear to 
you best adapted to the purpose of your 
detachment. I n  General, I would observe, t h a t  
a stationary post i s  unadvisable,  a s  it gives 
t h e  e n e m y  a n  opportuni ty  o f  knozving your 
position, and concerting plans successfully 
against you. In case of any offensive movement 
against this army, you will keep yourself in 
such a state as to have easy communication 
with it, and a t  the same time harass the enemy's 
advance" (May 17, 1778). 
In 1781, from September 28 to October 17, 
the outcome required von Steuben's experience 
a t  conducting a seige, but reaching those 
t w e n t y  d a y s  a t  Y o r k t o w n  h a d  r e q u i r e d  
Washington's natural gifts a t  being a Fabius 
for himself, and a t  taking an impetuous boy 
and turning him into another, and sticking to 
it for six years. 
Though won, the war was not over, and 
wouldn't be until the treaty was signed in 
September of 1783. During this entire interval 
Clinton was in command of an undefeated 
British army in New York. The situation 
required that Washington keep an inactive 
army under control for two more years, and 
finally manage to disband it without any money 
to send it home with. The problems were worthy 
of another Roman military and civil genius out 
of the pages of Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch, 
That would be Cincinnatus, but that's another 
story. 
T .  N.  W i n t e r  
University of Nabraska 
